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Robert Jacobs
This article traces the history of the development and construction of the first 
prototypes and operating nuclear power plants, all as part of the Manhattan Project. 
Beginning with CP-1, the first self-sustained nuclear chain reaction in 1942, it details 
subsequent Manhattan Project reactors and then examines the construction and 
operation of the first modern nuclear power plants built at Hanford, Washington. 
These were built for the sole purpose of manufacturing plutonium for nuclear 
weapons. The article argues that nuclear power was born violent: it was invented as 
part of the manufacturing process of nuclear weaponry. This argument goes beyond 
previous historiography focusing on the technological development of nuclear power 
to emphasize the purpose of its development, the mass and indiscriminate killing of 
human beings.
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Introduction: Born to Kill
On December 2, 1942 at the University of Chicago, a group of scientists and 
engineers produced an amazing technological achievement: a sustained nuclear 
chain reaction. Nuclear power was intentionally released in a controlled manner, 
adjusted, and then turned off. This experiment opened the doors for human 
beings to develop both nuclear power plants and nuclear weaponry. Indeed, both 
outcomes were a part of our world less than three years after that cold December 
day. 
The team, working under Enrico Fermi, was confident that they would 
be able to effectively control the nuclear chain-reaction. However, they did 
take rudimentary safety precautions in case the reaction became uncontrolled, 
having neutron absorbing materials at the ready. Three million people lived in 
Chicago in December of 1942, and they had no idea history was being made that 
Wednesday in a rackets court under the stands of Stagg Field, the university’s 
football stadium (rackets was an indoor sport popular in the United Kingdom 
that diminished in popularity after World War Two). Fortunately for all of them, 
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the experiment proceeded as designed and these safety measures were unneeded. 
Within a year of the success of the experimental reactor, dubbed CP-1 for “Chicago 
Pile 1,” the first model full reactor had been built and gone critical in Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, and within two years the first industrial reactors built to mass produce 
plutonium—or plutonium production reactors—had been built at Hanford, 
Washington. Ultimately nine nuclear reactors would be built at Hanford which 
would manufacture the bulk of the plutonium found in the cores of America’s 
Cold War nuclear arsenal. 
All of these efforts were part of the Manhattan Engineering District, or 
as it came to be known: the Manhattan Project. While the specific scientific 
discoveries that had opened the door to releasing the energy held within the 
nuclei of atoms were achieved by small research teams working at universities, 
the large-scale engineering required to harness that energy was funded entirely 
by the U.S. military, with the sole purpose of building nuclear weapons. The 
nuclear power plants built at Hanford would operate for four decades, and were 
used almost exclusively to manufacture plutonium for weapons. It would be more 
than ten years from the initial criticality of Manhattan Project nuclear reactors 
before nuclear power plants would be used to manufacture electricity for use by 
the general public in any country. Generating electricity is a secondary purpose 
for this technology; it was invented to make nuclear weapons. 
This article traces the origins of nuclear power technology as it was 
specifically developed to produce nuclear weapons for use against a civilian 
population in war. It will explore the scientific and industrial steps taken from the 
initial experiments in Germany and under the stands of Stagg Field in Chicago 
to develop the theoretical basis of nuclear energy production and subsequently 
of plutonium production, and then the industrial establishment of large nuclear 
power plants built at Hanford, Washington as a primary site of the sprawling 
Manhattan Project. It will trace numerous radiological disasters during the 
production history of the Hanford reactor fleet and at other military plutonium 
production reactor sites during the early Cold War. It will describe the later 
emergence of the nuclear power production industry which used nuclear reactors 
to also produce energy for civilian use and the history of partial and full nuclear 
fuel meltdowns that accompanied that industry. 
The very first history of CP-1 and Hanford was the official history of the 
Manhattan Project published by Henry DeWolf Smyth (1945). Subsequent 
histories of the Manhattan Project described the experimental and production 
reactors as part of the story of the project, but with little focus beyond describing 
their role in the project. Scholarship about CP-1 has primarily been focused 
on the scientific basis and organization of the experiment. The best work on 
the technical aspects of these sites, and the Manhattan Project as a whole, is 
Critical Assembly written by Lillian Hoddeson and co-authors (Hoddeson et al. 
2004). Since the end of the Cold War, site specific works on Hanford begin to 
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be published, including On the Homefront by Michele Gerber (1992), Atomic 
Frontier Days by Findlay and Hevley (2011) and Atomic Geography by Melvin 
Adams (2016). Kate Brown’s powerful comparison of the plutonium production 
sites of the United States and USSR at Hanford and Ozersk, respectively, 
titled Plutopia is one of the most important works that examines the legacies 
of plutonium production through the use of nuclear reactors to date (Brown 
2013). Trisha Pritikin, who grew up in Richland, Washington, has written what 
will be the definitive history of the legal claims filed by Hanford downwinders 
seeking compensation for their loses of health and land from the radiological 
contamination inflicted on the downwind communities during the decades of 
plutonium production at the site (Pritikin, forthcoming). 
These books do critical work in examining the establishment and operation 
of the Hanford site and of the radiological violence exerted on the local 
community. However, no work has traced back the fundamental violence of 
nuclear power plants: that they were first invented specifically to kill masses of 
human beings. Nuclear power plants were born violent.
The Scientific Basis
Scientists had known since the early twentieth century that there was incredible 
energy binding the nuclei of atoms together. Subatomic particle physicists would 
describe the universe as being made of up four fundamental forces: gravity, 
electromagnetism, the weak interaction, and the strong interaction. One of these, 
the strong interaction, or strong force as it was originally known, is the powerful 
energy that holds the nucleus together (Frisch 1961). Even as the structure of 
atoms was being parsed during the first decades of the twentieth century, the 
nucleus was seen as impenetrable until 1938 when the nucleus of a uranium 
isotope was split by a neutron in the lab of Otto Hahn in Berlin. Hahn had been 
conducting experiments with the physicist Lise Meitner, who had fled from 
Germany earlier in the year to escape Nazi prosecution. After Hahn and his 
assistant Fritz Strassmann obtained unusual results from a series of experiments 
Hahn shared these results in a letter with Meitner. Meitner speculated on the lab 
results obtained by Hahn and, with her nephew Otto Frisch, theorized that what 
had occurred had been the fissioning of the nuclei of some of the uranium atoms 
being used (ibid.). What had happened in Hahn’s lab was that by bombarding 
uranium atoms with neutrons, the nuclei of some number of the atoms had split, 
releasing the energy of the strong force contained within. News of the amazing 
discovery quickly spread throughout the physics world. 
In the United States, where many prominent scientists from Europe had fled 
to escape Nazi persecution, this breakthrough led to a flurry of experimentation 
to replicate and extend Hahn’s findings. Among the scientists engaged in this 
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work was Hungarian Leo Szilard, working at the time at Columbia University. 
Szilard had theorized the possibility of a weapon utilizing the energy locked in 
the nucleus while in London in 1933. Upon learning of Hahn’s discovery, Szilard 
sought to press upon the U.S. government the risk of such a weapon being 
developed by the Nazis. Szilard famously pressed upon his friend Albert Einstein 
to convey a letter regarding this possibility to American President Franklin 
Roosevelt, and the Manhattan Project was soon initiated (Lanouette 1992). 
Among the challenges for the Manhattan Project was how to produce 
sufficient fissionable material to achieve a nuclear explosion. Subsequent to Hahn’s 
work, experiments determined that it was a rare isotope of uranium—235U—that 
fissioned. Raw uranium mined from the Earth contains less than 1 percent of this 
isotope; other uranium isotopes did not fission. One possibility to make a bomb 
was to enrich uranium until a high concentration of 235U was obtained. Another 
possibility was to use plutonium. Plutonium had been “invented” by a team led 
by Glenn Seaborg in a laboratory at the University of California in late 1940.1 One 
isotope of plutonium, 239Pu, could also fission if bombarded by neutrons. 
Another primary challenge was to determine if a chain-reaction in a 
fissionable material was possible. Since the fissioned nuclei of 235U and of 239Pu 
gave off from one to three neutrons when fissioned, in was theoretically possible 
to split the nucleus of an atom with a neutron, and then when multiple neutrons 
were cast off by the reaction, to have more fissionable atoms packed close enough 
to the reaction to fission several more nuclei. Theoretically, one could initiate a 
process whereby fissioning some atoms, they would fission even more atoms and 
a chain reaction could be obtained. These challenges would structure some of the 
key installations and scientific endeavors of the Manhattan Project. A critical first 
step was to determine if a chain reaction could be achieved. 
CP-1: The First Chain Reaction
Scientists at the University of Chicago, working under physicist Enrico Fermi, 
achieved the first self-sustaining chain reaction on December 2, 1942. The 
experiment consisted of the construction and operation of the first atomic “pile” 
until it had achieved criticality. 
The pile itself was constructed of uranium, a material that is embedded in a matrix 
of graphite. With sufficient uranium in the pile, the few neutrons emitted in a single 
fission that may accidentally occur strike neighboring atoms, which in turn undergo 
fission and produce more neutrons. These bombard other atoms and so on at an 
increasing rate until the atomic ‘fire’ is going full blast. The atomic pile is controlled 
and prevented from burning itself to complete destruction by cadmium rods, which 
absorb neutrons and stop the bombardment process” (Fermi 1952, 23).
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The pile was assembled throughout November 1942 in a rackets court 
underneath the stands of Stagg Field, a football field on the campus of the 
University of Chicago, and was referred to as Chicago Pile 1, or CP-1. Over 400 
tons of graphite, 6 tons of uranium metal, and 50 tons of uranium oxide were 
configured into a large rectangular structure in a precise pattern designed by 
Fermi and his team (Hewlett and Anderson 1962). On December 2 the pile 
achieved criticality and was the first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction created 
by human beings.
The experiment proved that it was possible to control the release of energy 
from nuclear sources in a controlled and sustainable manner. The nuclear power 
Figure 1. The Only Photograph Taken during the Construction of CP-1
Source:  U.S. Department of Energy
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plants that would follow this event would not simply scale up the CP-1 design, 
they would ultimately augment and modify the configuration to more efficient 
standards, but it was on December 2, 1942, in that rackets court at Stagg Field, 
that human control over nuclear energy was midwifed. Both nuclear power 
and nuclear weapons are directly descended from this event, but the goal was 
unambiguous to those participating in the experiment. Warren Nyer, a young 
physicist on Fermi’s team who would go on to work on reactor development at 
the Idaho National Laboratory, remembers of the understanding among those in 
the rackets court on that Wednesday: “There were two things that might follow, 
nuclear power for civilian purposes, or, what was really the purpose at that time, 
a nuclear weapon” (Argonne 2012).
Following the experiment, CP-1 was disassembled in early 1943 and moved 
to the nearby Argonne Forest Preserve, a site that would become Argonne 
National Laboratory in 1944, where it was reassembled with modifications and 
operated under the name CP-2 until it was decommissioned in 1954. After the 
nuclear material was removed from CP-2, it was buried in the Cook County 
Forest Preserve in an area known as Red Gate Woods, where it remains today 
(Forest Preserves of Cook County, n.d.). 
CP-3 and the X-10 Graphite Reactor
“The immediate objective of building a uranium-graphite pile,” wrote Henry 
Smyth in the first official history of the Manhattan Project, “was to prove that 
there were conditions under which a chain reaction would occur, but the ultimate 
objective of the laboratory was to produce plutonium by a chain reaction” 
(Smyth 1945, 99). Several reactor prototypes were subsequently envisioned and 
constructed to inform the design of the nuclear power plants that were to be 
built at Hanford. These included CP-3, built at Argonne, and the X-10 Graphite 
Reactor, built at the Clinton Engineer Works in Tennessee which would become 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
CP-3 was the first heavy water reactor ever built and was “designed and built 
as an alternative design for the Hanford project, in case unforeseen difficulties 
should arise when the Hanford plant went into operation,” because, “there was 
a possibility that graphite moderated nuclear reactors could not produce the 
fissionable material required for the Manhattan Project program” (Nuclear 
Engineering Division, n.d., 13). The Argonne site, known in the Manhattan 
Project as Site A, became the first nuclear reactor site to generate sufficient 
radioactive waste to require a disposal site, which became known as Plot M at 
Red Gate Woods. “Plot M was a 150-foot by 140-foot area approximately 1,500 
feet north of Site A. The 1940s method of nuclear-waste disposal consisted of 
digging a 6-foot-deep trench, dumping the waste, and backfilling the trench with 
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soil” (USDOE 2017, 2). The most dangerous waste would later be dug up and 
shipped on to other U.S. government sites for disposal. 
The X-10 graphite reactor, also known as the Clinton Pile, was a variation 
of CP-1 and was aimed at determining an efficient design for plutonium 
production and extraction. The pile would need large amounts of electricity and 
was, in part, sited in Tennessee because of the copious production of electricity 
from the Tennessee Valley Authority construction during the New Deal. It was 
intended that the X-10 reactor would be used for training and development 
purposes to help improve the design and operation of the reactors being built at 
Hanford. Along with the graphite reactor, the Clinton Works also contained the 
first industrial sized plutonium separation facility. The X-10 reactor achieved 
criticality in November 1943, by March 1944 it was producing significant 
quantities of plutonium, and by the summer quantities of plutonium were being 
shipped to Los Alamos for experimental purposes (Hewlett and Anderson 1962). 
Oak Ridge was the location where uranium was enriched sufficiently for it to be 
used in the core of nuclear weapons. 
Figure 2. CP-3 Burial Site in Plot M at Red Gates Woods “Site A” of the Forest 
Preserves of Cook County
Source:  U.S. Department of Energy
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Hanford during the Manhattan Project
Fermi’s pile in Chicago was an essential step in the achievement of industrial 
level nuclear power plants, but such plans did not wait or hinge on its results. 
On the day before the success of CP-1, Manhattan Project military head General 
Leslie Groves had formally authorized the construction of nuclear reactors for 
plutonium production at Hanford (ibid.). The site was originally referred to as 
Site W and was eventually known as the Hanford Engineer Works (Sanger 1989). 
The specific location was chosen because of the abundance of two essential 
ingredients for operating nuclear power plants: water and electricity. The water 
came from the nearby Columbia River; Site W was built in the Columbia Basin as 
it turned 90 degrees to flow westward towards the Pacific Ocean. The electricity 
came from the recently completed Bonneville Dam located further downriver 
in the Columbia Gorge (Harvey 2000). The plants were built and operated as a 
plutonium production facility by the chemical giant E.I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Company on behalf of the U.S. government (Sanger 1989). 
The first nuclear reactor built at Hanford was the B Reactor. Construction 
began in March 1943, as did construction of facilities for the workers. Three 
reactors would be built and operated during the Manhattan Project period, with 
the D Reactor and F Reactor following the B Reactor. All three were graphite 
moderated and water-cooled reactors (Gerber 1992). 
As the purpose of the entire facility was the production of plutonium, four 
Figure 3. Construction of the B Reactor at Hanford, 1944
Source:  U.S. Department of Energy
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chemical separation plants were built during the wartime period to process the 
spent fuel rods of the three reactors. The first shipment of plutonium was finalized 
in late January 1945, after which regular shipments of plutonium were sent from 
Hanford to the laboratory in Los Alamos. The plutonium was transported to Los 
Alamos by truck, with each shipment accompanied by radio equipped cars filled 
with armed guards (Hewlett and Anderson 1962). 
The wartime construction of Hanford was unprecedented for a previously 
undeveloped site: 
Army engineers and DuPont’s TNX Division, a division created specifically for 
HEW [Hanford Engineer Works] construction built over five hundred structures 
in addition to those for living requirements. Workers laid 158 miles of railroad and 
386 miles of automobile roadway. Over 50 miles of electrical transmission lines and 
four step-down substations were constructed. Hundreds of miles of fencing were 
emplaced, and 40,000 tons of structural steel and 780,000 cubic yards of concrete were 
utilized. During 1944 and early 1945, a peak of about 50,000 construction workers 
were housed at a barracks and trailer camp at the old Hanford townsite. The wartime 
construction of Hanford cost about $230 million (Gerber 1992, 35-36).
The water consumption for the three reactors operating during the war 
would equal the requirements of a city with a population of a million people 
(Hewlett and Anderson 1962). 
Three cities were built to accommodate the workforce and their families: 
Richland for management, Kennewick and Pasco for laborers and support 
workers. While originally these towns were assembled as temporary accom- 
modations, eventually each became a coherent and independent city, although the 
region was and is still known as the Tri-Cities area. DuPont’s internal company 
history assessed that over 140,000 workers passed through Hanford during the 
Manhattan Project era (Sanger 1989). 
The scientists at Los Alamos came up with two different designs for nuclear 
weapons: the gun design (which was envisioned since the beginning of the 
project), and the implosion design. Ultimately both would be built. The gun 
design weapon was built with the highly enriched 235U that was manufactured 
at Oak Ridge, and was then used in the nuclear attack on Hiroshima. The much 
more complex implosion design was built with the plutonium manufactured at 
Hanford, and was detonated twice in the summer of 1945: first at the Trinity Test 
in New Mexico (the first nuclear weapon detonation on Earth), and subsequently 
in the weapon used in the nuclear attack on Nagasaki. Each of the weapons used 
in the nuclear attacks would ultimately claim over 100,000 lives, most of these on 
the days of the nuclear attacks. 
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Hanford during the Cold War
After the end of war, Hanford would come to manufacture most of the plutonium 
that would form the cores of the more than 60,000 nuclear weapons built by the 
United States during the Cold War, with some additional production coming 
from the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. As the Cold War intensified, so 
too did the work of the nuclear reactors and plutonium separation facilities at 
Hanford. The H Reactor would be built in 1949, and four more reactors would 
come online in the 1950s. The final reactor, the N Reactor would be built in 1963. 
Five reprocessing plants for plutonium separation would eventually be built in 
two locations on the reservation. The four reactors built in haste in the 1950s can 
be seen as a direct response to the Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1949, 
and as an embodiment of the arms race for the United States, which was to a large 
extent predicated on levels of plutonium production in the military reactor fleets 
of both the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The fleet of reactors stretched along the bend of the Columbia River 
operated continuously, except during brief periods of refueling, for decades. 
While ultimately there would be nine nuclear reactors at Hanford, only the final 
reactor, the N Reactor, ever contributed electricity to civilian power usage (the N 
Reactor was still primarily a plutonium production reactor). During the height 
of the Cold War, from 1961 to 1963, American plutonium production peaked at 
7.5 tons per year (Cochran, Arkin, and Norris 1988). In total, Hanford produced 
Figure 4. Nuclear Reactors Stretch along the Columbia River at Hanford in 1960
Source:  U.S. Department of Energy
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49.1 metric tons of plutonium in the eight reactors dedicated to weapons grade 
plutonium production, and produced another 8.1 metric tons of fuel-grade 
plutonium at the N Reactor (Makhijani et al. 1995). 
During the Cold War, the United States produced over 60,000 nuclear 
weapons, most of them with the plutonium produced at Hanford. This includes 
both fission weapons like the one used in the nuclear attack on Nagasaki, and 
also in thermonuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons were not used in warfare 
after 1945, over 2,000 weapons have been detonated in nuclear tests, roughly 
half of those (1,054) by the United States. The United States tested 928 nuclear 
weapons at the Nevada Test Site, and another 67 at the Pacific Proving Grounds 
in the Marshall Islands. Two hundred and sixteen of those tests were in the 
atmosphere, which distributed vast quantities of radioactive fallout in heavy 
quantities close to the test sites, and also globally when the atmospheric clouds 
reached the upper atmosphere. A 2015 article in The Lancet describes how “risk 
modelling studies of exposure to ionising radiation from the Nevada Test Site in 
the United States suggest that an extra 49,000 (95 percent CI 11 300–212 000) 
cases of thyroid cancer would be expected to occur among U.S. residents alive at 
the time of the testing—an excess of about 12 percent over the 400,000 cases of 
thyroid cancer expected to develop in the absence of fallout” (Simon and Bouville 
2015, 407-408). The Marshall Islands had far fewer tests than the Nevada test site, 
however the United States tested its thermonuclear weapons exclusively at the 
Pacific Proving Ground which resulted in massive amounts of radioactive fallout 
affecting the local population and also entering into the Pacific Ocean from 
which the radionuclides could disperse throughout the Pacific Rim. 
One test, the Bravo test of 1954, which was the largest weapon ever tested by 
the United States, created a vast and lethal fallout cloud that engulfed numerous 
Marshallese atolls. The entire population of Rongelap Atoll suffered from 
radiation sickness after the Bravo test. The Japanese tuna fishing boat the Daigo 
Fukuryu Maru, among many others, was also exposed to the fallout cloud. When 
it came to port in Yaizu, Japan two weeks after the test, its crew was hospitalized 
for radiation sickness. One crew member, radioman Aikichi Kuboyama, died of 
complications from his exposure six months later, even though he was physically 
located about 100km from the actual detonation point. All of these illnesses and 
deaths can be traced back to the nuclear reactors at Hanford. 
During its years of production, Hanford was the site of numerous substantial 
radiological releases that endangered the local population as well as those 
downwind. Among the most grievous was the notorious Green Run conducted in 
late 1949. The Green Run was a planned experiment to facilitate the monitoring 
and assessment of the nascent Soviet plutonium production capabilities. While 
plutonium production had been rushed during the Manhattan Project, after 
the war the spent nuclear fuel was typically “cooled” before the plutonium was 
extracted from the fuel rods. “After discharge from the Hanford reactors, the 
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irradiated nuclear fuel was normally stored for many weeks before processing,” 
describes a Fact Sheet published by the Technical Steering Panel of the Hanford 
Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project. “This ‘cooling the fuel’ delay 
allowed short-lived radioactivity to decay. The cooled fuel was dissolved in nitric 
acid and the solution processed to separate the plutonium” (Technical Steering 
Panel 1992, 1). The practice specifically minimized the distribution of 131I (a 
radioactive isotope of iodine) as well as to decrease the risks to the workers from 
short-lived radionuclides. This was done, in part, because the United States had 
a stockpile of plutonium and did not urgently need the material as it had during 
wartime. Once the Soviet Union had built and tested its own nuclear weapons 
earlier in the autumn of 1949, the United States became frantic to assess the 
plutonium production of the Soviet Union to gauge its capacity to build up a 
nuclear arsenal. 
The Green Run was designed to process a batch of fuel rods for plutonium 
extraction before the “cooling” period. Historian Kate Brown (2013, 169) writes, 
“The experiment called for processing a ton of twenty-day ‘green’ fuel and 
tracking its distribution across the Columbia Basin…If Air Force officers could 
find out how much short-lived radioactive iodine came out of the ton of green 
fuel, they could estimate from monitoring the air on the borders of the USSR 
how much plutonium the Soviets were making.” To facilitate the experiment, the 
filters in the discharge stacks of the processing plant were turned off. The Green 
Run, which a U.S. Government Accounting Office report later described as an 
“atomic energy intelligence collection experiment” would ultimately release as 
much as 12,000 curies of radioiodine and contaminate a vast area downwind: “after 
the test, radioactive iodine was found on vegetation over large areas of southeast 
Washington and Oregon” (Government Accounting Office 1993, 6-7). Hanford 
scientists would later point out that although the Green Run was a radiological 
disaster, it distributed significantly less radioiodine than was routinely released 
during the Manhattan Project era, “the amount of material being dissolved 
was, I think, smaller than normal. This was just a batch that had been fixed up 
particularly for them. When the reactors had run originally—when the military 
was very, very interested on getting their hands on plutonium—they put out 
a lot more than was put out in the Green Run” explained health physicist Carl 
Gamertsfelder (Gamertsfelder 1995).
Large releases of radiation into the nearby ecosystem would be routine 
during the operation of the Hanford reactors and especially the plutonium 
extraction procedures. These activities would leave a disastrous legacy once 
the plants were closed. As more and more information became public after 
the closure of the site, there was a growing awareness in the community that 
exposures to radiation had been far more extensive than previously designed and 
had occurred over a long time period. Numerous studies of these impacts were 
commissioned by various governmental bodies. 
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In 1986, the Hanford Health Effects Review Panel, convened by the Centers for 
Disease Control at the request of the Washington State Nuclear Waste Board and the 
Indian Health Service, recommended that potential doses from radioactive releases 
at Hanford be reconstructed. The states of Oregon and Washington, representatives 
of three regional Indian tribes, and DOE [Department of Energy] agreed that an 
independent technical steering panel (TSP) should direct the HEDR Project [Hanford 
Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project], which is managed and conducted by 
the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (Haerer et al. 1990). 
Additionally, a Hanford Thyroid Disease Study was mandated by Congress 
in 1988 (Davis, Kopecky, and Hamilton 2002). These studies would document 
broad public exposure to radiation resulting from the operation of the Hanford 
site over many decades, extending far beyond the borders of the facility and the 
specific personnel employed there.
The B Reactor was decommissioned in 1968; other reactors were 
decommissioned during the next two decades with the final reactor, the N 
Reactor, being decommissioned in 1987. 
Hanford’s Radiological Legacy
In 1989, two years after the decommission of the last of the Hanford nuclear 
plants, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency identified between 1,200 and 
1,500 sites where toxic materials had been dumped on the Hanford reservation 
(Schneider 1989). Very few of these have been monitored. A dramatic example 
is the PUREX tunnels, where a significant collapse occurred in 2017. During its 
normal operation, spent fuel rods were transported from reactors to chemical 
separation facilities by rail cars that were operated remotely because of the 
intensely high levels of gamma radiation coming from the rods. When production 
ceased, the highly radioactive rail cars that had performed this task were loaded 
with contaminated equipment and buried in tunnels, the PUREX tunnels. These 
were then abandoned and had little ongoing monitoring, as the radiation was 
largely inert, coming from the irradiated equipment, and posed little threat of 
migration. In May 2017, one of the PUREX tunnels collapsed. The day of the 
collapse is uncertain as there was no ongoing monitoring of the tunnels; it was 
discovered by workers on May 7 (Cary 2017). 
Far more vexing than the abandoned waste dumping sites is the Tank Farm, a 
site encompassing 177 underground tanks containing a mix of highly radioactive 
waste and toxic chemicals. One hundred and forty-nine of the tanks were single-
shelled, having only one wall containing the waste, and twenty-eight later tanks 
were double-shelled (Edgemon et al. 2009). The tanks are actively monitored 
twenty-four hours a day, and toxic fumes leaking from the tanks has resulted in 
the hospitalization of over seventy workers per year for the past several years. 
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The tanks contain over 53 million gallons of radioactive and chemically toxic 
waste, and a substantial number of the tanks have been leaking for decades. The 
U.S. Department of Energy, which oversees the site, estimates that over 1 million 
gallons of waste has leaked from the tanks and is migrating underground towards 
the nearby Columbia River (Committee on Remediation of Buried and Tank 
Wastes 1996). 
Today, seventy-five years since production began at Hanford, and over 
thirty years after production ceased, the site is a maze of ecological disasters and 
mismanagement. Vast quantities of waste await the development of technologies 
that are envisioned to contain them. The worst of this waste is being actively 
managed but not efficiently contained, and even the workforce that is engaged 
in these efforts is at risk. The budgets required to strategize and approach these 
challenges are being slashed from administration to administration. Politics 
is hardly adequate to grapple with millennia long risks. A proposal by the U.S. 
Department of Energy, which oversees the legacy waste clean-up of the U.S. 
nuclear weapon complex—including Hanford—envisioned reclassifying some 
high-level waste as low-level waste in December 2018. This would include the 
waste in the Tank Farm at Hanford. If such a policy were implemented the waste 
in the tanks would no longer have to be removed from the leaking tanks and 
permanently contained; it could simply be capped with concrete and left in the 
tanks to leak. A USDOE spokesperson explained “the change could save the 
federal government $40 billion in cleanup costs across the nation’s entire nuclear 
Figure 5. Construction of Nuclear Waste Storage Tanks at Hanford, 1943
Source:  U.S. Department of Energy
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weapons complex, which includes the Savannah River Plant in South Carolina 
and Idaho National Laboratory” (Geranios 2018).
Historical Disasters at Plutonium Production Sites
Hanford did not suffer a major fuel meltdown or catastrophic fire. However, all 
other nuclear weapon states have also operated multiple plutonium production 
reactors and the first two large-scale nuclear disasters occurred in such reactor 
complexes, happening within two weeks of each other. 
On September 29, 1957, writes Kate Brown, as a soccer game was being 
played in a stadium in Ozersk, in the Chelyabinsk Oblast near the Ural Mountains 
in Central Russia, where the Mayak Production Association was located, a loud 
explosion was heard nearby.
The source of the blast was an underground storage tank holding highly radioactive 
waste that overheated and blew, belching up a 160-ton cement cap buried twenty-four 
feet below the ground and tossing it seventy-five feet in the air. The blast smashed 
windows in the nearby barracks and tore the metal gates off the perimeter fence. A 
column of radioactive dust and smoke rocketed skyward a half mile (Brown 2013, 
232). 
The explosion and subsequent radiological disaster, known as the Kyshtym 
Disaster, occurred just eight years and one month after the detonation of the first 
Soviet nuclear weapon made with plutonium produced at Mayak, the plutonium 
production that was the target of surveillance motivating the Green Run at 
Hanford.
The radioactive cloud from the explosion, “settled over an area of 20,000 
square kilometers, home to 270,000 people” (Rabl 2012). The Soviet authorities 
were slow to react to the crisis. “A week after the explosion,” writes Brown, who 
did extensive fieldwork in the region as well as at Hanford, “radiologists followed 
the cloud to the downwind villages, where they found people living normally, 
children playing barefoot. They measured the ground, farm tools, animals and 
people. The levels of radioactivity were astonishingly high” (Brown 2013, 239-
240). The contaminated area would eventually be known as the East Urals 
Radioactive Trace (Ichikawa 2015).
Eleven days later a fire ignited in one of the reactors at the Windscale Works, 
the plutonium production site of the United Kingdom located in Cumbria in 
Northwest England. The fire burned inside of the reactor for three days and 
released massive amounts of radiation blanketing surrounding communities and 
downwind areas. “While the authorities denied large releases of radioactivity 
at the time, this was not a correct portrayal of the situation…On 12 October, 
24 Robert Jacobs
authorities stopped the distribution of milk originating from seventeen area 
farms. However, just three days later, milk from a far wider area (200 square miles 
compared to the previous 80) was restricted” (Makhijani et al. 1995, 418). Fallout 
from the accident was detected in Ireland, and the confiscated milk was dumped 
into the Irish Sea (Bertell 1985). 
The Establishment of Commercial Nuclear Power
While the promise of commercial nuclear power was promoted to the public 
immediately after World War Two, it would not happen for almost a decade. The 
first experimental plant to actually produce a miniscule quantity of electricity 
was the X-10 reactor at Oak Ridge in 1948. However, the Experimental Breeder 
Reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory produced enough electricity to 
illuminate four light bulbs in 1951. The first nuclear power plant to contribute 
electricity to the grid for public usage was built in the former Soviet Union. In 
1954, the Obninsk Nuclear Power Plant, in the city of Obninsk southwest of 
Moscow, came online for power generation purposes, and not for plutonium 
production. In 1956, Calder Hall-A came online in the United Kingdom, 
operating alongside the two plutonium production reactors located at 
Windscale. In 1957, the Shippingport Atomic Power Station on the Ohio River 
in Pennsylvania achieved criticality and began to feed power into the U.S. grid. 
Commercial plants would follow in France (1962) and Canada (1968); ultimately 
450 commercial nuclear power plants would be operating in 31 countries by 2016 
(European Nuclear Society, n.d.). 
Many of these plants would experience occasional leaks or releases of 
radiation into their local ecosystems. Several would have catastrophic nuclear 
accidents. In addition to the accidents at plutonium production reactors cited 
above, partial core meltdowns would occur at Santa Susana in Simi Valley, 
California (1957), Fermi-1 in Detroit, Michigan (1966), the Lucens reactor in 
Vaud, Switzerland (1969), Leningrad-1 in Leningrad, USSR (1975), and Three 
Mile Island-2 in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (1979). A full, catastrophic nuclear 
meltdown occurred at Chernobyl-4 (1986) and three full meltdowns occurred at 
Fukushima 1-2-3 in 2011. 
In addition to these dire nuclear accidents, the spent fuel from normal 
operations at nuclear power plants pose a vexing problem for tens of thousands 
of generations. These spent fuel rods will need to be effectively contained for 
millennia as they will remain highly dangerous for over 10,000 years, and 
seriously dangerous for over 100,000 years. Almost all of this spent fuel, millions 
of tons, sit in temporary or intermediate storage on the grounds of the reactors 
where the fuel was burned. Finland will be the very first nation to attempt to 
permanently store the spent fuel from its very limited nuclear power program 
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in deep geological storage at the Onkalo site on the Baltic Sea, beginning in the 
2020s. All of the spent nuclear fuel from the long history of operation at Hanford 
still sits in temporary storage, some of it for over seventy years now (Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 1997). The challenges of containing this highly 
toxic waste for millennia and insuring that the sites are not damaged by geological 
forces or breached by future human societies is speculative at best. The ongoing 
capacity of nuclear power to damage the health of human beings and other 
creatures for millennia, through the risks posed by this waste, means that we can 
never adequately grasp the full violence that will result from its production (Jacobs 
2018). To date, over seventy years after the successful operation of CP-1, not one 
spent fuel rod has been placed in “permanent” storage anywhere on the planet.
Conclusion 
All nuclear weapon states begin their weapon programs by building and 
operating nuclear power plants. Any nation with nuclear power can proceed 
towards building nuclear weapons; if they have not pursued weapons it is because 
they have taken a political decision, for whatever reason, not to build them. It is 
possible to operate nuclear power plants without building nuclear weapons, but 
no nation has yet manufactured such weapons without first operating nuclear 
power plants. 
Figure 6. Calder Hall #1 at the Windscale Site in Cumbria, UK
Source: U.S. Department of Energy 
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Whatever its history was to become, however it was later utilized, the very 
first nuclear power plant was built specifically to kill 100,000 people—a goal that 
was efficiently and fully realized. Nuclear power was born violent: it was born as 
a fundamental element of a program designed to manufacture weapons of mass 
destruction. The expanded plutonium production sites of the nuclear weapon 
states sustained an ongoing potential through nuclear weapon arsenals to kill 
hundreds of millions more during the Cold War and beyond. 
The violence of nuclear power plants is not limited to their use in 
manufacturing nuclear weapons. Nuclear meltdowns have caused the early deaths 
and the illness of untold thousands more. The number of deaths resulting from 
the Chernobyl disaster alone are bitterly contested, in part, because illnesses 
caused by internalized radionuclides rarely lead to direct and provable causation. 
Any visit to the communities surrounding the Chernobyl exclusion zone in both 
Belarus and the Ukraine makes the public health impacts obvious. The health 
impact of the triple meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi continues to unfold before 
us. 
Beyond the visible, nuclear waste may kill and harm for tens of thousands 
of years to come. Hundreds of thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel rods will 
remain deadly for over 100,000 years and must be successfully contained for 
that entire period of time to protect the health of thousands of generations of 
humans and other creatures yet unborn. Nuclear power will remain violent long 
past the generation of any electricity that will benefit any being. The legacy waste 
of operating nuclear power plants—for weapons or for electricity—will remain 
Figure 7. Chinzei Middle School, Nagasaki 1945
Source: United States Strategic Bombing Survey
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dangerous for longer than human civilization has so far existed. 
Notes
1.  I bracket the term “invented” since plutonium does exist in nature—in the miniscule 
amount of 235U that has fissioned naturally—but it was unknown to humans at the time it 
was isolated in the lab by Seaborg.
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